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 Abstract 
 
Normative reasoning in welfare economics and social contract theory usually presumes 
invariable, context-independent individual preferences. Following recent work particularly 
in behavioral economics this assumption is difficult to defend. This paper therefore explores 
what can be said about preferences and their changes from a motivation-theoretic 
perspective, i.e. by explaining what motivates economic agents in making their choices and 
what mechanisms of change are at work here. We show that on this basis it is possible to 
complement social welfare assessments by a differential weighing of different human 
motivations which is derived from empirically informed foundations rather than from ad 
hoc arguments. 
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1. Introduction 
By pointing to inconsistencies and the context-dependency of individual preferences, recent works in 
behavioral economics have raised doubts about how preferences are usually represented in economic 
theorizing. As highlighted by Sugden (2006), the decision anomalies observed in numerous 
experiments also challenge the basis for normative economics usually presuming invariable and 
coherent preferences (Hausman and McPherson 2009). In response to these problems, attempts have 
been made that implicitly follow Sen’s (1977) early suggestion to extend the ‘informational basis’ of 
welfare economics beyond the narrow confines of ordinal utility theory. Sen’s (1985) capability 
approach can be seen as his own, highly influential, step in that direction. A different strategy has 
been proposed by Sugden (2004) with his notion of welfare that is based on the concept of 
‘opportunity’ and on the idea that, as an autonomous agent, the individual has to bear ‘responsibility’ 
for whatever preferences she may form in life. Still another proposal by Ng (2003) transcends the 
level of manifest preferences and suggests to regain solid ground for welfare evaluations by focusing 
on individual happiness as the ultimate goal of public policy. 1 
 
 All these approaches try to replace or at least complement the orthodox preferentialist 
concept of welfare, either by the notion of capabilities, or by that of opportunity or of happiness. 
However, all these approaches refrain from specifying more precisely what the objects or states are 
that increase an agent’s quality of life, satisfy her preferences, or yield subjective well-being, and for 
 
1  See Frey and Stutzer (2007) for a critical discussion of ‘Happiness Politics’. Some have 
argued that Sunstein and Thaler’s (2003) concept of ‘libertarian paternalism’ -- seemingly supporting 
an orthodox notion of welfare (and rationality) by suggesting to shield biased agents from the 
welfare-decreasing effects of their ‘errors’ without restricting their choice set -- can actually be shown 
to build on richer notions of well-being (Lowenstein and Haisley, 2008); see also Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) and for a related approach involving “asymmetric paternalism” Camerer et al. (2003). 
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what reasons (or, as in the case of the capabilities view, no explanation is given for why a particular 
specification is postulated). These are the motivational aspects of behavior which in the more narrow 
utilitarian terms translate into the question of what the place holders x1, ..., xn for the arguments of 
an individual utility function  u(x1, …, xn) stand for.  
 
 As we will set out to show in this paper, an extension of the informational basis of normative 
economics that accounts for these motivational aspects makes a difference with respect to the 
welfare implications of a behavioral approach to economics. At the explanatory level the motivation-
theoretic perspective (what is it that drives decisions and actions?) and the decision-theoretic view 
(how are decisions actually made -- what systematic biases occur as compared to the ideal of 
‘rational’ choice?) represent complementary facets of behavior. At the normative level, in contrast, 
the two aspects seem to match with a substantially differing range of arguments and theories. One of 
the differences on which we will elaborate in more detail is that, unlike in the framework focusing on 
decision anomalies, the inquiry into the motivational foundations of behavior leads to specific 
hypotheses as to how the motivation to act, and hence the individual preferences, systematically 
change over time.  
 
Specific information on the motivational aspects of behavior that can thus be derived is of 
obvious normative relevance. Moral intuition frequently acknowledges that, in judging on a 
particular choice or action, it can be decisive to know how it is motivated. Welfare assessments with 
quite a diverse background often also implicitly or explicitly refer to differences in how the 
underlying behavior is motivated as, e.g., certain postulates in Sen’s (1992) capabilities approach or 
arguments known from  the basic needs approach (Streeten and Burki 1978, Thomson 1987), 
claiming higher normative weight for the satisfaction of what are considered ‘basic’ needs. Also 
Scanlon’s (1975) differentiation according to the suggested ‘urgency’ of different preferences is a case 
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in point, as are Pigouvian redistribution arguments The analysis we are going to present supports 
the conjecture that all these contributions share, viz. that moral judgments hinge on the motives 
underlying observed behavior. However, we suggest to found this conjecture on an empirically well 
established motivational theory of human behavior and, by doing so, to go beyond the unspecific 
canonical preference satisfaction concept in normative economics. 
 
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the need to extend the informational 
basis of normative economics. Section 3 presents the motivational theory on which our normative 
discussion will be based. Section 4 discusses some normative implications, focusing in particular on 
shifts in the normative ‘weights’ resulting with a growing individual capacity to satisfy needs and 
wants. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Moving Beyond ‘Given’ Preferences 
Behavioral economics has delivered ample evidence that human preferences are not as perfectly 
consistent and immutable as rational choice theory represents them (Sugden 2006). This insight is 
relevant not only for positive (descriptive) economic theory, but also for normative economics. The 
most important implication is that the standard view, equating well-being with the satisfaction of 
‘revealed’ preferences only, is no longer plausible and operational. This is so for essentially three 
reasons: First, logical circularity issues are involved when the preferences on whose basis social 
states are being evaluated turn out to be themselves shaped by those states. Second, with malleable 
preferences, determining which state of preferences should serve as a consistent basis for a criterion 
of well-being becomes an arbitrary decision. Third, when preferences are partly shaped by the 
situational context, it is no longer plausible to assume that they reliably indicate the individual’s 
level of well-being. As Sen (1987: 45-46) has emphasized, even agents enduring an ‘objectively’ 
miserable situation may well ‘learn to prefer’ it in order to reduce their cognitive dissonance. (In 
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certain cases, indoctrination may also be involved.) Then, these agents’ stated preferences may 
conflict with a variety of other indicators of well-being, including their own state-dependent, revealed 
preferences.  
 
 Hence, with the richer account of human preferences normative theory faces what may be 
called a ‘quicksand’ dilemma. To cope with it, it is widely agreed now that the ‘informational basis’ of 
the concept of human well-being needs to be enriched. The standard welfarist approach that equated 
well-being with utility, narrowly defined as the satisfaction of given ‘revealed’ preferences (choice), 
only makes use of a very limited kind of information, viz. ordinal information on observed choice 
behavior insofar as it can be used to construct well-behaved utility functions (see Kelsey 1987). 
 
 By excluding information on important aspects of the quality of life of real-world people (e.g., 
the rights and entitlements emphasized by Sen), economics has a hard time in giving advice on 
policy issues in which these aspects are at stake. Furthermore, if well-being is defined in a low- or 
even one-dimensional way, it is always possible to derive strongly counter-intuitive implications -- a 
possibility that undermines the credibility of welfare economists’ policy advice (which ultimately 
always aims at convincing real-world citizens). Two social states with identical distributions of 
individual utilities may differ very much in terms of other, empirically equally important, currencies 
of welfare.  
 
Sen (1985) suggests to account for this critique by systematically enriching welfare 
economics’ account of human well-being with non-utility information, in particular with empirical 
data on functionings. While he retains the general consequentialist approach of welfare economics, 
he proposes an alternative ‘evaluative space’ that is considered to be better able to provide a reliable 
indicator of human well-being and social welfare. A lot of extra information on constituents of man’s 
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quality of life – which Sen apparently considers as self-evident -- enters the welfare calculus, such as 
provision of food, health services, and the satisfaction of complex psychological needs such as 
‘appearing in public without shame.’ Others have followed this methodological lead so that the state 
of affairs now is that the evaluative criteria underlying the modern welfare economic calculus  have 
become distinctly multidimensional: Human well-being may be defined and assessed in terms of 
‘laundered’ (perfectly informed, say) preferences (Sobel 1994), happiness (Ng 2003), or in terms of the 
formal opportunity to act on whatever preferences one may turn out to have (Sugden 2004).  
 
In view of this diversity of approaches the question can be raised which information should 
be used for enriching the foundations of normative economics. The quality of life of real-world human 
beings seems to depend on a large number of factors. From a perspective that looks beyond the 
standard ‘revealed preference’ concept of well-being, this set of elements comprises mental states, 
experiences and ‘objective’ attributes. Mental states may be, e.g., feelings of pleasure, experiences 
may be the experience of an agent to choose freely from a set of options (the privilege that, in Sen’s 
famous example, separates the fasting man from the starving), and an objective attribute may be a 
certain functioning (in the sense of Sen), real income, or the history of an agent’s entitlements (as in 
Nozick 1974). Which of these factors should be accounted for in making normative judgments on 
human well-being should not be left to intuition or common sense.  It is possible to identify the 
factors that play an essential role by means of an empirically backed and psychologically informed 
account of human well-being and its motivational underpinnings.  
 
 We therefore plead for incorporating empirical insights on human motivation into normative 
economics. It is generally acknowledged that the motivation behind an agent’s preference (and, 
hence, the utility derived) can be decisive for the moral assessment of that agent’s behavior or a 
particular social state that agent finds herself in. An often cited example concerns a sadist deriving 
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pleasures from torturing others (Sen 1981). In this example normative reasoning draws on 
information about a perverse motivation to satisfy the common moral intuition that the sadist’s 
source of well-being is not legitimate. A monstrosity of this kind illustrates the point, but it cannot 
substitute for a more general and subtle account of what motivations matter normatively, and how. 
Such an account has to be based on an encompassing theory of human motivation that allows not 
only to identify different motivations – which may then be treated differently as to their relative 
weight in a welfare calculus – but also to inquire into the processes that govern the change of 
motivation. These processes can be argued to deserve their own normative assessment. 
 
3. What Motivates Economic Action? 
In economics the question of what induces agents to have a preference for something, to form a 
preference order over their choices, and to act accordingly is rarely addressed.  In the original, 
Benthamite version of sensory utilitarianism, in contrast, the question was center stage and 
answered by an elaborate hedonistic theory according to which action is motivated by seeking 
pleasure and avoiding pain. This explanation has recently been revived in behavioral economics by 
Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997). But a revival of hedonistic hypotheses is not the only way of 
reconstructing the motivational foundations of economic behavior. There are also non-hedonistic 
explanations which focus on the motivating power of drives, (deprived) needs, and wants. 2 While in 
economics the motivational explanations fell out of fashion (see Broome 1996), in the behavioral and 
human sciences research on the motivational underpinnings of behavior continued and was 
 
2  Need-theoretic reasoning has a tradition reaching back to Aristotle. Several economists have 
made use of it to explain the motivation underlying economic behavior, among them Duesenberry 
(1949), Georgescu-Roegen (1954), and Ironmonger (1972).  
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deepened further by extending the focus to the biological, evolutionary roots of behavior (Caplan 
1978). With these extensions, attention is drawn to inter-personal commonalities in what motivates 
behavior. 3 In the perspective of such a broadened behavioral view, pleasures and pains are 
themselves explicable in terms of physiological or psychological processes that trigger such feelings 
and induce the agents to act (Rozin 1999). These physiological and psychological processes belong to 
the domain of theories of needs and drives as motivators/inhibitors of action.  In terms of these 
theories it can be argue that, if a need is deprived, the (temporary) reduction or removal of 
deprivation is classified as a pleasurable experience. Conversely, rising deprivation of a need can be 
expected to cause increasingly painful feelings.  
 
Since we are interested here in explaining what motivates economic action, it is necessary to 
be more specific as to what the relevant needs are and for what kind of behavior they are relevant. 
Unlike earlier need-theoretic approaches in economics, we follow Witt (2001) in adopting a strictly 
behavioral interpretation of needs.4 Let a certain action reduce or eliminate deprivation in a certain 
 
3  Much as the layout of the human body is genetically determined, so are basic human 
behavioral capacities and dispositions. They are shared by all humans with the usual genetic 
variance. Apparently, natural selection has not systematically modified them over the last millennia. 
They can therefore be conjectured to be adapted to the living conditions in the early phases of human 
phylogeny in which selection pressure was still tight. These basic behavioral capacities and 
dispositions may best be understood in terms of the value which they seem to have had for 
reproduction and survival under such conditions (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992). 
 
4  We do not adopt Maslow’s (1954) often cited hypothesis of a need hierarchy (amounting to 
the assumption of lexicographic preferences), since there is little empirical evidence for that 
hypothesis, see Wabha and Bridgewell (1976). 
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need. If this event increases the rate with which that action is chosen in the future, the satisfaction 
of the need is connected with (unconditioned) reinforcement. Restricting the notion of needs to those 
for which this connection holds (‘basic needs’), need satisfaction can be identified with ‘primary 
reinforcement’ in the theory of instrumental conditioning.5 Thus, if satisfaction and deprivation of 
basic needs are classified as pleasurable and painful experiences respectively, a triple 
correspondence between hedonistic, need-theoretic, and reinforcement-theoretic motivation 
hypotheses can be established. The correspondence can be used to give the hedonistic, utilitarian 
hypotheses richer connotations than they originally have.  
 
To demonstrate this, consider choices by which a preference order is revealed. With regard to 
the motivation underlying the choices the question is what induced the decision maker to consider 
the alternatives and prefer or value them more or less. A hedonistic explanation would refer to the 
pleasures and pains which the decision maker associates with the alternatives to choose from and 
the balance between them. Simplifying somewhat, pleasures and pains are assumed to be 
homogenized into a single hedonic currency – the utility index – taken to express the relative 
strength of the action motivation (Shizgal 1999).  Thus, a higher value of the hedonic currency 
suffices as a proximate cause for the motivation underlying an observed choice of an action. What 
determines the pleasure and pain feelings from which utility is derived does not have to be, and 
 
5  See Herrnstein (1990). Only a limited number of needs qualify for this category. In a rough 
approximation they can be identified with such activities as drinking, sleeping, eating, keeping body 
temperature, physical activity, sex, and seeking pain relief, shelter, affection, social recognition, 
sensory arousal, cognitive consistency, and achievement (see Millenson 1967: 386). Given their 
obvious reproductive value in times of fierce selection pressure, such basic needs can be argued to be 
innate and, indeed, they are commonly shared by humans (and not only humans) with the usual 
genetic variance. 
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usually is not, specified.  The suggested need-theoretic explanation, by contrast, provides an ultimate 
cause for the motivation underlying the choice of an action. It does so by identifying how the action 
reduces deprivation with respect to some specific need(s) – related above to primary reinforcers – 
and, thus, triggers a pleasurable experience (generates utility). Moreover, besides giving deeper 
reasons for how utility is generated, the present interpretation also offers an important dynamic 
extension by explaining  how the motivation to act (or, for that matter, utility or preferences) change 
over time. One adaptation dynamics is instrumental conditioning, the other is conditioned 
reinforcement or conditioning learning (see,.e.g., Leslie 1996).  
 
The adaptation dynamics implied by instrumental conditioning (‘reinforcement learning’) 
converge to a state in which the relative frequencies of choices among alternative actions over a 
given period of time match the relative size of the rewards previously obtained from the alternative 
actions. This rule is called the ‘matching law’ (Herrnstein 1997, an empirical generalization based on 
hundreds of experiments at the level of behavior with little or no cognitive participation, see Davison 
and McCarthy 1988). The reward accruing to an action depends (a) on how much deprivation of the 
need(s) which it serves there is to be reduced and (b) the actions’ relative effectiveness  in 
accomplishing deprivation reduction.  Accordingly, at any point in time the relative strength of the 
motivation to take an action hinges on the degree of deprivation of the need to be served by the 
action to the degree of deprivation of all other needs and the actions’ relative effectiveness. 
    
 The consequence of these non-cognitive behavioral regularities is that, over their 
conditioning history, the agents on the one hand adjust to the reward structure of each single need. 
On the other hand, they learn to adjust to the relative ease with which reinforcement can be 
obtained in their environment across their needs. The result is that the agents tend to specialize 
with respect to where they seek more or less intensely the rewarding experience of need satisfaction. 
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(Such specialization patterns may be strongly supported by cognitively controlled self-efficacy, see 
below.)  Beyond all variance caused by such individual specializations there is, however, one general 
tendency in the mean behavior triggered whenever the overall means for satisfying needs grow with 
rising income. This tendency results from the fact that basic needs differ with respect to their 
deprivation-satiation patterns in a way that is similar across all humans. There are basic needs 
where deprivation can, in principle, be reduced temporarily to zero, i.e. which can be satiated quite 
easily. Examples are the needs for liquids or for calorie intake where this is a concomitant of the 
body’s homoeostatic metabolism. But there are also basic needs where, for different reasons, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to reduce average deprivation to zero. Typically, these are needs whose 
satiation level is defined in relative terms like the need for arousal or for social recognition. Since 
this observation has important normative implications (see below) we summarize it as: 
 
Hypothesis 1 With rising opportunity for serving basic needs (i.e. rising real income), different 
needs show characteristic, inter-personally similar differences in their deprivation-
satiation patterns such that some are on average more easily satiable than others.  
 
 The adaptation dynamics implied by conditioning learning (conditioned reinforcement) are 
quite different. They result from the fact that an organism tends to learn to associate stimuli that 
trigger an action leading to reward (a pleasurable experience) and neutral stimuli (triggering neither 
a pleasurable nor an aversive experience), if these two kinds of stimuli coincide repeatedly. Once 
such an association is established, the originally neutral action triggers a rewarding experience qua 
the learnt association. A conditioned (secondary or acquired) reinforcer is then established.6 Making 
 
6 This effect works even if the previously coinciding primary reinforcement is dropped, but the 
strength of a conditioned reinforcer fades away, if the association is not at least occasionally 
corroborated. An example of how such associations are learned may be helpful. Imagine taking 
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use of the triple correspondence between the different motivational theories we may speak here of 
the emergence of an “acquired want” whose satisfaction triggers pleasurable feelings and hence is 
capable of changing the agents’ preferences. For the normative implications to be discussed below 
this important feature can be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2 An elaborate structure of acquired wants can emerge over an individual’s lifetime 
through conditioning learning on the basis of the few innate needs. Acquired wants 
show no specific deprivation and therefore no specific satiation either. (The 
motivation to act on acquired wants is upheld if the association with a deprived 
primary reinforcer is at least occasional corroborated.) 
 
 Unlike the widely shared basic needs, the emerging structure of acquired wants is of a highly 
idiosyncratic nature. It would make little sense, therefore, to produce a list of learnt reinforcers 
comparable to that of the limited number of innate ones. Together with the individual specialization 
patterns resulting from the adaptations under instrumental conditioning, the structure of acquired 
wants explains a good deal of the observable inter-individual variance in human preferences. 
However, the particular cultural (conditioning) environments in which the agents live have an 
influence on what associations the agents happen to learn and result in a certain cultural bias in the 
 
repeatedly a good meal when hungry in a special setting characterized by particular aesthetic 
aspects like scenic architecture, furniture, tableware, table music etc. Assume that the special 
setting is initially experienced as a neutral stimulus. Through the repeated coincidence, an 
association is learnt between good eating and the features of the special setting by which scenic 
architecture, furniture, tableware, table music etc. can become a rewarding experience in their own 
right – a conditioned reinforcer – so that the frequency with which the corresponding exposure is 
chosen is increasing – even if no longer coinciding with eating activities.  
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individually acquired wants. For this reason, agents in similarly socialized groups or similar cultural 
environments may show less variety in their acquired wants than agents from different 
backgrounds. 
 
  The motivational underpinnings of economic behavior would, of course, be incomplete 
without hypotheses that account for the cognitive influences that intervene into the motivational 
structures shaped by instrumental conditioning and conditioning learning. An economically 
particularly relevant case is the cognitive construction or perception of means-ends relationships as 
it often underlies deliberate decision making. Where actions are recognized as instrumental for 
attaining the actual need satisfaction this can change observable behavior away from what 
reinforcement contingencies would predict. The perception of instrumental relationships can 
consciously be manipulated and actual reinforcement thus postponed as in the case of self-efficacy 
(Bandura 1986). Furthermore, cognitive activity can induce own motivational forces as, for example, 
the consistency of self-image (Dunning 2007) and the pervasive need for high self-esteem (Gollwitzer 
and Kirchhof 1998). 
 
 However due to limitations of the information processing capacity of the human mind and 
the selectivity of attention processes, cognitive interventions are always of a selective nature. 
Whether intervening cognitive activities are triggered hinges on the information input which, in 
turn, is contingent on the way in which incoming stimuli are processed. The outcome of the internal 
cognitive activities that are triggered is difficult to predict. For that reason, hypotheses on the effects 
of cognitive intervention on economic behavior are often easier to derive from exploring how the 
information input is constrained so that these constraints and their changes over time deserve a 
closer inspection.  
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 The crucial feature here are selective attention processes that filter out which of the stimuli 
usually offered in abundance to the sensory system will be processed further in the working memory 
(Anderson 2000: Chs. 3, 6, and 7). What signals grab attention depends on both their physically 
measurable attributes (frequency and relative strength) and on whether, and if so what, meaning 
can be attributed to them. Meaning is identified through tracing information from long term memory 
in which knowledge is stored that has previously been accumulated. In order for elements of long 
term memory to be made available, they have to be activated selectively through cognitive cues 
contained in the information coming from outside. This means that at any point in time the 
incremental change of individual action knowledge through newly processed information ultimately 
hinges on already existing knowledge that can be activated in long term memory. However, the 
cognitive cues and the associated memory content differ in how much attention they are able to 
attract, depending on the affective value of the particular meaning that is associated. The affective 
value, in turn, reflects the strength of previous rewarding (pleasurable) or aversive (painful) 
experiences that are memorized in association with the information.  
 
Put differently, the more an agent has developed an explicit preference (or aversion) for a 
particular information or an object or event to which the information refers, the more affective 
weight is attributed to its meaning, and the more likely attention is allocated to that information. 
Thus, what new knowledge an agent acquires is not only contingent on her already existing 
knowledge. It also hinges on the current state of her preferences that influence the selective 
allocation of attention. Since this conclusion is again of normative significance (see below) we 
summarize it as 
 
Hypothesis 3 The interactions between the current state of the agents’ knowledge and the current 
state of their preferences feed back on the further shaping of both the agents’ 
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perceptions and preferences. Extending the attention given to an action possibility at 
the expense of others allows to recognize details in that possibility which otherwise 
are likely to have gone unnoticed (refinement effect).  
 
 
 4. In What Way Is the Motivation to Act Normatively Relevant?  
In the previous section, a utilitarian, a need-theoretic, and a reinforcement-theoretic interpretation 
of the motivational side of human behavior have been discussed. The three interpretations have been 
shown to correspond with one another in several respects. However, if, as proposed, innate needs and 
acquired wants are identified with primary and secondary reinforcers respectively, the need-
theoretic interpretation  often allows to be more specific with respect to what it is that motivates 
behavior, or what generates utility and in which way.7 Furthermore, with the hypotheses 1-3 derived 
on that basis, an economically significant connection can be established between rising real per 
capita income as a driving force on the one hand and the dynamics of differential need satiation, of 
 
7 In the normative context this has the advantage of allowing to assess the normative value of 
human action motivators in a more comprehensive way. In the utilitarian tradition, the choice of one 
action over another is usually interpreted as an expression of preference satisfaction and, hence, of a 
welfare improvement (with ordinal utility this holds as long as the Pareto criterion is satisfied). As 
mentioned, the ultimate causes for the choice of the action (beyond the proximate cause ‘preference 
satisfaction’) are not specified – except in the case of obviously anti-social or perverse preferences. In 
that case the usual inference from preference satisfaction to welfare increases would lead to 
counterintuitive conclusions. Instead of checking the full spectrum of motivations in this regard, a 
moral filter is constructed by denoting in an ad hoc fashion a subset of action motivations that is 
denied any positive weight in the welfare calculus; see, most prominently, Harsanyi (1982).  
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acquiring new wants, and of cognitive and affective specialization on the other hand. It is precisely 
this connection that is of additional normative significance. The different, income driven, 
developments implied by hypothesis 1 - 3 are neither all neutral nor all equal with respect to their 
normative implications.  
 
 When consumption rises sufficiently with a growing real per capita income, some basic needs 
will more quickly approach a satiation level than others. Typically, the more easily satiable needs 
like those for liquids, food, or body heat are based on homoeostatic, physiological mechanisms with a 
minimal subsistence boundary that needs to be met in order for an organism to survive. This 
contrasts with the less easily satiable needs and, in particular, those that will probably never reach a 
satiation level, e.g., because satiation is defined in relational terms as – for different reasons – in the 
case of the needs for social status recognition or for arousal. We will argue that the differences in 
satiability and the reasons behind them are relevant for specifying welfare when preferences change 
over time.  
 
 With an increasing satiation of some of the basic needs more resources become available for 
consumption activities serving the refinement in acquired wants and cognitively constructed motives 
that concomitantly develop. Producers have incentives to come up with innovations supporting the 
development of those consumption motivations. In view of the technically ‘insatiable’ nature of 
acquired wants and cognitively constructed motives it is not surprising that they tend to absorb a 
share of rising income that can become significantly larger than the amount spent on the basic needs 
on which they are conditioned. However, the very ‘learning to prefer’ that is going on in the 
formation of acquired wants and cognitively constructed motives implies a peculiar asymmetry. Had 
there been no opportunity for such learning, e.g. because of lack of income, it would mean no sacrifice 
in welfare if the possibility of serving (not yet learned) wants and motives were removed. Once the 
16
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learning experience has been made, though, the removal of that possibility would translate into a 
sacrifice in welfare. Under certain conditions, we claim, this asymmetry is normatively relevant. 
 
 This claim can best be defended by means of a contract-theoretic argument, i.e. by recourse 
to the construct (or thought experiment) of a hypothetical social contract.8 When placed behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. a fictitious situation of genuine uncertainty about what positions they will 
occupy in the post-constitutional market game, the participants in the social contract can be 
imagined either to consent or not to consent to a normative judgment that discriminates between the 
satisfaction of the various future preferences they are likely to develop. Following the standard way 
in which this device is made operative we thus assume that the agents are ignorant not only of the 
positions, but also about the specific content of their preferences after the veil has been lifted. Yet 
contrary to this view we do assume that they are perfectly aware of the fact that their preferences 
will develop and change systematically as outlined in the previous section.9 
 
 
8 A corresponding welfare-theoretic justification would face some unresolved issues. It would 
require a measure for an individual’s states of deprivation or satiation concerning the various needs 
and wants in order to balance them in a common ‘currency’ like utility and, furthermore, to 
aggregate utility balances across persons. 
9  Note that for a variety of reasons, put forward already by Hume, the possibility that a 
contract is fictitiously approved does not allow to conclude that it is normatively ‘legitimate’. In the 
real world, actual legitimacy can only be achieved by factual consent, which, however, is difficult to 
obtain. We take this to imply that the conclusions presented here should be understood as no more 
than arguments provided for the ongoing process of public deliberation in a civil society in which 
responsible individuals endowed with a capacity of moral judgment (Rawls 1971) will decide which of 
the offered normative arguments to  subscribe to. 
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 To illustrate the conditions under which a hypothetical consent of this kind can plausibly be 
imagined to arise let us consider two different hypothetical scenarios in this and the next section. In 
the first scenario, disposable per capita income is assumed to develop very unevenly (a not perfectly 
unrealistic assumption). This would mean that for some agents in the economy – the ‘needy’ – their 
poverty deprives them of satisfying their basic needs at a level necessary for their subsistence 
(which, with minor resource claims, could actually easily be satisfied). In contrast, the well-to-do part 
of the population would be in the position to engage in spending ever more resources on the 
satisfaction of needs that are difficult or impossible to satiate and for which no subsistence level is 
defined, such as the needs for social status or arousal; or in the position to increasingly chase after 
the most recent refinements of acquired wants or cognitively constructed motives.  
 
 Now suppose that in the hypothetical social contract situation everyone expects that real per 
capita income will be rising, but perhaps very unevenly. If the (hypothetical) agreement on a social 
contract would be based on the Paretian welfare criterion, the different motivations for spending the 
additional income would not matter. Whatever the stipulations regarding the distribution of the 
rising income would be, they would find consent if and only if they ensure that no-one is made worse 
off while at least one agent is better off by them – whether already well-to-do or not. When the 
differences in the motivations underlying the use of extra income in the two subpopulations are 
acknowledged, however, additional information becomes relevant. It allows to anticipate which of the 
preferences that are caused in the different ways mentioned above will be satisfied (more or less) 
under different distributions of income.  
 
It is plausible to assume that an impartial assessment by the agents deliberating behind the 
veil of ignorance on a social contract would make use of this additional information. Since all agents 
share the basic needs (with some genetic variance) they can be expected to be aware of what it 
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means to suffer from deprivation of basic needs at the subsistence level. Likewise, they can expected 
to understand the opposite situation where, with the high disposable income, expenditures to a large 
extent serve needs that are difficult to satiate anyway or purposes one has learned to appreciate, but 
would not miss had there been no opportunity to learn the corresponding wants. It is then likely 
that, they follow common moral intuition and attribute unequal weight to the different motivations. 
Hence we arrive at 
 
Proposition 1 Suppose in a hypothetical situation of striking a social contract the agents are 
ignorant about their future positions and specific preferences but endowed with 
information about the general dynamics of preference learning and the satiation 
characteristics of needs and wants. Assuming that they make use of that information 
they can be expected to attribute a higher weight to the reduction of deprivation of 
basic needs at the subsistence level -- if and where it occurs -- than to other 
motivations. They are then likely to consent to stipulations of the social contract that 
account for such a priority in preference satisfaction, if necessary by redistributive 
measures.  
 
The differential weighing at the level of normative reasoning may at the level of practical 
policy-making thus serve to legitimize redistributions of resources to help those who are ‘needy’ in 
the above sense. 10  This conclusion is similar to much what Sen’s (1992) capability approach pleads 
 
10  It matters, of course, what time dimension is envisaged for deriving this normative 
conclusion. While in the short run, proposition 1 seem to require no qualification, this may be 
different in the longer run in order to avoid disincentives on the part of the needy. On a longer time 
horizon, the redistributive transfers may therefore be earmarked to help the needy to improve their 
chances of being able to earn themselves the necessary income, e.g. by subsidizing their education 
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for and to what Scanlon’s (1975) differentiation according to the ‘urgency’ of preferences that differ 
may imply. It also reminds of the elder utilitarian (Pigouvian) attempts to justify income 
redistribution based on the conjectured hedonic impact of a decreasing marginal utility of money. 
What is new, however, is the explicit behavioral foundation that differentiates between needs, 
acquired wants, and cognitively constructed motives and that therefore can give deeper reasons for 
assigning different normative weight to the different motivations for spending resources on 
consumption. The implications of this extension are largely compatible with Sen’s and Scanlon’s 
conclusions (which lack an explicit behavioral underpinning). But there are obvious differences with 
respect to the Pigouvian notions which, at the same time, claim a decreasing marginal utility of 
money in all uses of money and an indefinitely growing (insatiable) total utility arising from 
spending additional money.   
 
 The argument underlying proposition 1 can be generalized to cover not only national 
redistributive measures, but also international ones, provided the more abstract notion of 
humankind is accepted to define the scope of the social contract in place of the national community. 
(Sen 2009 argues that a key deficiency of the standard social contract approach is that it is usually 
made operative by separating national constituencies from each other.) In fact, in present times, this 
implication seems the more momentous one. The reason is that the criterion suggested for moral 
legitimization – the motivation underlying the spending of resources – entails a threshold value that 
is significant, in particular, in international comparisons. It is defined not in terms of a ‘good life’ 
(whatever this means), but in terms of a subsistence level with respect to basic needs for which a 
 
and health rather than subsidizing their consumption directly. In our view this issue concerns the 
question of how to conceptualize ‘capacities’; beyond that, it concerns the level of policy instruments 
rather than the level of policy goals proper. 
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survival condition must be met. At the national scale, in all highly developed countries the 
disposable real per capita income has grown beyond what is necessary to cover the subsistence level. 
A large share of the population living in the condition of the ‘needy’ in the above sense is, however, a 
real situation in many less developed countries where absolute poverty is a vastly more frequent 
phenomenon than in the developed world. An extension of proposition 1 to the international scale 
would therefore suggest a normative rectification for an international redistribution of income to the 
truly poor. The argument provides an explicit foundation to what is probably implicitly presupposed 
as a reasonable normative assumption in the plea for international resource transfers by the basic-
needs approach (Streeten and Burki 1978, Thomson 1987) to foster economic development. 
 
 The implications of the present approach deviate from some normative pleas made earlier in 
the literature. This becomes apparent once one moves from a situation with a few well-to-do and a 
large majority of needy as in the developing countries to a situation characterizing highly developed 
countries. With their modern welfare states the conditions under which income redistribution occurs 
are characterized by a large majority of the population that qualifies as  relatively well-to-do and a 
small minority of ‘very rich’. Both the well-to-do and the ‘very rich’ are in a position to spend a large 
fraction of their resources on  consumption that serves difficult or impossible to satiate needs like 
that for social status or arousal; or that serves freshly acquired wants and refined, cognitively 
constructed motives. For that reason, the condition for rectifying redistributive measures in terms of 
the outlined social contract – the deprivation of basic needs at the subsistence level – is no longer 
given. Even in the presence of drastic income differences no (hypothetical) consent on redistributive 
measures is therefore likely to arise as in proposition 1.  
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5. The Scenario of International Environmental Protection Negotiations  
Let us now turn to the second scenario. The growth of consumption has boosted the depletion of non-
renewable resources and contributes to the greenhouse effect and other forms of degradation of the 
environment. If, as it seems, such externalities are not fully internalized because of prohibitive 
transaction costs and/or myopic time horizons, their effects accumulate over time and their costs will 
have to be incurred by future generations. It cannot be excluded therefore that future generations 
are going to face significantly reduced opportunities to satisfy their preferences. However, unlike the 
comparison of the income situation of different groups within a living generation where the 
differences can directly be verified, a comparison with the living conditions of future generations is 
beset with uncertainties. Technological progress and continued accumulation of human capital and 
real capital may entail economic advantages that are almost impossible to predict and to balance 
with the future costs of a depleted and degraded environment. 
 
 For this reason, a normative assessment of the situation by making use of the veil of 
ignorance device requires additional assumptions not only about the (probably discounting) attitude 
that the living generation takes towards the fate of future generations, but also about the risk 
attitudes towards the mentioned uncertainties. The choice of these assumptions is likely to have a 
significant impact on the conclusions -- behind a veil of ignorance, a risk-friendly society is likely to 
reach a consent that is quite different from the one of a risk-averse societies (Witt and Schubert 
2008). Since it is known from decision making research that in face of large risks people tend to be 
risk-averse (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982), let us assume for the sake of the argument 
that in the living generation risk aversion prevails with regard to the disposable income of future 
generations. This means that, under the two modifications made for this scenario, the living 
generation would be willing to account for the negative effect that the own resource use has on the 
preference satisfaction that future generations can afford. 
22
 #1005 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In order to assess the most interesting normative implication of the motivational aspects in 
such a scenario let us assume that resource depletion and environmental degradation are the direct 
consequence of the resource use in economies of two very different types.  The first type is that of a 
less developed (‘poor’) economy in which per capita income is so low that the resources available for 
consumption in the majority of the population suffices at best to avoid deprivation of basic needs at 
the subsistence level. Let the second type of an economy be a highly developed (‘very rich’) one in 
which the agents can afford to spend  the lion’s share of their very high per capita income on 
difficult-to-satiate needs and on refined acquired wants and cognitively constructed motives 
following up the sophisticated consumption innovations of a creative consumer goods industry. 
Resorting to the veil-of-ignorance device and accounting for the difference in the motivation to use 
resources in the two types of economies it can be expected that their different circumstances- result 
in inter-generational social contracts taking quite different forms. Even in an impartial assessment, 
the agents in a poor economy have no reason to weigh the low disposable per capita income of future 
generations more important than their own, a situation that differs entirely from the one of a very 
rich economy. Hence we suggest 
 
Proposition 2 Behind a veil of ignorance, there are good reasons to assume that agents imagining 
to end up in a ‘poor’  economy consent on rejecting stipulations in an inter-
generational social contract that reduce depletion and degradation at the cost of also 
reducing spending in the living generation. If the agents imagine to end up in a ‘very 
rich’ economy, in contrast, there are good reasons to assume that their calculus of 
consent results in stipulations designed to reduce the spending of the living 
generation and the concomitant depletion and degradation to the advantage of future 
generations.  
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As a measure to achieve such a reduction in a very rich economy one could think of a progressive 
consumption tax. 11 
 
The difference between the two types of economies regarding the normative judgment on 
consumption-curbing activities is not very surprising, but it has a notable implication once we turn 
away from the juxtaposition of a ‘poor’ subsistence economy and a ‘very rich’, affluent economy.  
Consider a constellation in which a ‘very rich’ economy is compared to a ‘rich’ one. Let the latter be 
defined by a relatively lower real per capita income that suffices, however, to avoid deprivation in 
basic needs at the subsistence level. Analogously to the above argumentation that compared well-to-
do and very rich subpopulations within one economy, the normatively relevant income threshold is 
exceeded in both the ‘rich’ and the ‘very rich’ economies. Let the relevant criterion again be whether 
or not this threshold is exceeded – and, hence, not the absolute differences in the ability to spend. If 
so, it can be concluded that differences in real per capita income between societies  which all exceed 
the level of a subsistence economy provide no reason for consenting on an inter-generational social 
contract stipulating reductions of spending by a society that are the higher the higher the real per 
capita income of the society.  
 
 
11  Such a tax has been proposed by Frank (1999). Focusing on relational, status seeking 
consumption activities he argues that, because of the arms-race like nature of the increased 
spending, growing expenditures ‘waste’ resources without actually raising welfare. However, 
consumption activities by which status can be signaled often also serve other needs or are even 
predominantly motivated by other needs. In such cases, the reason given by Frank for a normative 
legitimization of a progressive consumption tax may not be sufficient, while the reason given here 
may be. 
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This conclusion, derived from motivation-theoretic consideration, is in notable contrast to the 
notions of justice informing the present international negotiations about how to distribute the 
burden of fighting the greenhouse effect. The latter notions grant a reduction of, or exemption from, 
that burden to countries that actually exceed the level of a subsistence economy. Since by our 
definition of the different consumption levels these countries would have to be classified as ‘rich’ 
economies, our criterion based on the motivations of resource uses would not treat them differently 
from the most developed economies. 
 
 6. Conclusions 
Behavioral Economics has shown that in many economically relevant situations, individual 
preferences may be incoherent and subject to (partly systematic) endogenous change. This challenges 
the basis for standard notions of welfare in economics that usually presume preferences to be 
constant and context-independent. While several approaches to overcome this problem have been 
proposed recently, they all tend to focus on decision-theoretic ‘anomalies’ and their implications – not 
on the motivational underpinnings of behavior. In this paper we have therefore adopted a 
motivation-theoretic perspective instead, asking which factors motivate human behavior. We have 
argued that a fruitful way of answering this question is a behavioral approach that connects to the 
well established theory of drives and needs, differing in so far from earlier theorizing in economics 
about the role of needs and wants, which was mainly informed by introspection and common sense 
arguments.  
 
We have claimed that, from such a point of view, preference formation and change result in 
three different ways. First, over a lifetime agents tend to specialize in what they prefer and 
accumulate refined knowledge on; second, differential satiation effects have an impact on and modify 
existing preferences; third, the agents acquire new preferences through cognitive and non-cognitive 
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learning. The basis of these adaptation processes can be traced back to innate dispositions and 
mechanisms which can be conjectured to be inter-personally shared with the usual genetic variance. 
This is the small set of what we have called ‘basic needs’ and the two mechanisms of conditioning 
learning and inferential (cognitive) learning. Taken together these innate endowments enable 
human agents to learn rich structures of acquired wants and cognitively constructed motives, 
starting from the small set of common basic needs. For the normative implications of these 
behavioral foundations it is important that basic needs on the one hand and acquired wants and 
constructed motives on the other hand differ markedly with respect to their contingency and their 
satiation dynamics.  
 
A conclusion that we have drawn from this argumentation is that in recognizing these 
differences, agents behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance about their specific future positions and 
preferences may agree upon attributing different weights to the opportunity to satisfy basic needs, as 
compared to the opportunity to satisfy acquired wants or constructed motives, respectively. We have 
claimed that the conclusion holds independently of the actually realized level of (e.g. hedonic) well-
being. Finally, we have demonstrated how this approach can be applied to derive practical normative 
implications for concrete examples. 
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